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Historically, we have relied in the United States on the three
classic powers of a government to control the use of land: the power
to condemn, the power to tax, and the power to police. These are the
powers inherent in every organized state; indeed, they may be regarded
as primary attributes of sovereignty. We have added to these powers
as the nation has developed, in ways that are more or less unique in
scale of execution if not in concept. This has been done in two ways:
Through the power to spend public funds discriminately, and through
the power to inform.
Over a century ago, Alexis de Tocqueville was impressed during
his celebrated tour of America with the scale of the programs of
public works that he witnessed and the vigor with which they were
pursued. This tradition remains strong. The spending power has
undoubtedly been the dominant tool by which government has sought to
guide land use in the public interest in the United States. We spend
public money in ways that discriminate among land uses. There has been
a tolerance of differential distributions of benefits that in an
international perspective is amazing. Many private land usershave
benefited and have largely retained their gains. Many less fortunate
land users have been hurt and have
land is taken in a legal sense are
and cultural convention has shaped
not been compensated. Only if their
they entitled to damages. This legal
land use in the United States more
powerfully than any other rule. First with canals and wagon roads,
then with the railroads, ports, and street railways, and finally through
the manner in which we have built roads, airports, drainage and irrigation
works and promoted river basin development we have guided if not controlled the
* Paper presented at the 1973 National Public Policy ;onference, Gull
Lake, Minnesota, September 19, 1973, sponsored by the National Public
Policy Education Committee and the Farm Foundation.use of land. It remains to be seen whether or not this has always been
in the public interest.
The power to inform has hardly been less important. Land records
are public records in the United States. They are not, in many countries.
Transactions in land have been openly reported. It has been culturally
acceptable to inquire about the price. The market has been a relatively
open one, with a tradition of disclosure that is regarded with awe,
and suspicion, in many other countries. The land was for the most part
uniformly surveyed, at early stages of development if not always ahead
of settlement. Conditions were created, in short, that promoted market
processes in allocating land among alternative uses. This freedom was
abused, and still is, but it is ta.stimony to the fact that perfec-
tion of the market has been a major goal of public policy to promote
land use in the public interest.
The power to police has evolved in the past half century from
simple beginnings in the law of nuisances into a complex structure of
powers to zone. To many people, land use control means zoning. It
is clearly the most ubiquitous example of public policy toward land use
at the local level of government. The authors of a recent assessment
1/
of land use controls in the United States begin with the history of zoning.—
This is a disservice to the understanding of our land policy. Pre-
ceding efforts to regulate land use through the police power there wer!e
significant developments of control through outright ownership, most
prominently of the National Brks and National Forests. The National
Parks in particular were unique institutions. Nothing quite like them
existed before. They have been widely studied and used as models by
other countries. This expression of control rested on public ownership.
The acquisition of land for public works projects has also had
a history in the United States that is unique among developed countries
committed to a system of private property rights in land. Beginning
with canals, and railrtids, and perfected in the era of the motor car
andbrge-scale river basin planning, we possess one of the world’s most
~/ Fred Bosselman and David Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land
Use Control, Washington, Council on Environmental Quality, 1971.
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developed and efficient bodies of law authorizing the taking of private
land for public purposes. Especially with regard to areas of “critical
environmental concern”, we have had our most extensive experience with
land ’use controls in the form of outright public ownership or acquisition.
It is a misreading of our history to identify the birth of land use
controls in the United States with the birth of zoning. A major part
of the history of our land policy is a history of the exercise of land
use control through public ownership.
It remains true, however, that the methods of overt land use control
used to date in the United States depend primarily upon some variation
of zoning. The use of this tool in the United States is more extensive
than in any other country. This resulted from our federal structure,
the historic detachment of local governments at the frontier of settle-
ment, and a preference for modes of control that seemed to present a minimum
challenge to established property rights.
This history contrasts sharply with the preference for more direct
forms of land use controls in developed countries of Western Europe, from
which we derive our cultural and our legal heritage.
Our modern development of land use control methods mirrors our
history of transport development. The most portentous result has been
the American suburb with single-family detached houses on generously
sized lots.
The resulting suburban sprawl
that supply creates its own demand.
programs to increase the available
suburbs by improved road systems.
presents a variation on Say’s law,
This is illustrated by policies or
supply of building land in the
The increased supply has not only
created its own demand, but increased demand above previous levels.
It has been fashionable to “live in the suburbs” and commute to work.
The greater the number who did it, the greater the number who wanted
to do it. Suburban living has become a “taste good” or “style good.”
To deal with urban problems we must deal with questions of fashions in
living--with “life styles”.4
This is the central problem faced by those who complain about our
failure to develop mass transit. The automobile introduced a new life
style, a new fashion, in living. In this case, the mode of transport
was the independent variable.
But it is not clear that this process can be generalized to other
modes of transport. If busses or mass rail transport are to be the
independent variables which will change fashions in living, it is
clear that people will have to be forced to ride them by strict land
use controls. This is what the Swedes have done. This is what the
British have tried to do. Can it be accomplished in the United States?
It will be much more difficult than in Sweden or Great Britain.
Acceptance of strict land use controls in Sweden was helped tre-
mendously by its role as a neutral in two World Wars. The possibility
of maintaining this role was highly dependent on maintenance of a
domestic food supply base. Prevention of the conversion of good farm
land into urban types of land use was given tremendous moral and
ultimately political support by the desire to preserve Swedish neutrality.
Although Great Britain was not a neutral in the two World Wars, it was ’also
acutely conscious of the fact that it could not feed itself from its
own land resources.
When war broke out in 1939 it was estimated that the British could
survive for only 13 weeks out of 52 from dowstic production. By
heroic efforts this was raised from 25% of requirements to perhaps
55% at the end of the war (28 weeks) and to about 60 per cent in the
immediate post war period. This still left Great Britain dependent on
imports for 40 to 45% of her food supply, for virtually all of her fiber
supply and all of her demand for tropical and subtropical goods (citrus,
tobacco, tea, etc.) Fresh from threats of siege and blockade, it was
relatively easy to promote stiff controls in post-war Britain on the
conversion of land from agricultural to urban uses.
In both England and Sweden the competition between urban and farm
demands for land takes place in their more productive agricultural
areas --the south and east of England (Manchester-Birmingham-London)
and the south and west of Sweden (Stockholm-Malmo-G6teborg) .
Many of the most acute urban pressures upon land in the United
States occur in areas of relatively unproductive land! Boston-5
Pittsburgh-Washington; Milwaukee-Chicago-Cleveland-Detroit; Houston;
Dallas-Ft. Worth; the Twin Cities; Phoenix-Tempe; San Diego.
The San Francisco Bay area is an exception, as are a number of
other California areas, Hawaii, and some Middle Western Cities: Omaha,
Indianapolis, Des Moines, Peoria-Decatur-Bloomington, and others.
But in general the U.S. areasof greatest agricultural productivity
are not subjected to severe encroachment from urban demands for land.
The Corn Belt, the Mississippi Delta, the Dairy Belt, and many irrigated
valleys of the West escape the worst of the urban thrust.
This leads to a key question: Is it possible to enforce stiff
controls on the conversion of agricultural land in a country producing
an agricultural surplus? The countries that have the tightest controls
on land use today are countries that have either faced recent threats
to their food supply in wartime, or
substantial fraction of their food,
in the United States.
It is ironic that criticism of
* to accomplish land use control is
are dependent on imports for a
or both. These forces are absent
the use of the police power
most acute
where zoning has been most effective. Its very success has become a
measure of its failure. In a historic decision, the State Superior
Court of New Jersey in 1971 set aside the entire zoning ordinance of
Madison township, Middlesex county, on the grounds that the
minimum lot sizes of one and two acres, and minimum floor space
requirements could not be achieved in houses costing under
$45,000.~’ Earlier in the year both labor unions and business firms
had brough suits to set aside large-lot zoning in other New Jersey
communities seeking to keep out working-class residents. It was
charged, for example, that the New Jersey Township of Mahwa had so
zoned its land that virtually none of the 5000 workers in the Ford
Motor Company’s plant there could afford housing in proximity to their
&/ Ronald Sullivan, “Restrictive Zoning is Upset in Jersey”, New York
Times, Oct. 30, 1971, p. 1.
——work.z~ In another action, the Johns Manville Corporation brought suit
against the Township of Bedmi.nister, charging that the 5-acre lot size
minimum was
,,~/
“exclusionary, unreasonable, arbitrary and unconstitutional.
More recently, the Report of the New”York Temporary Commission on
the Powers of Local Government recommended the establishment of state-
wide zoning standards that would “make it impossible for suburban and
rural communities to erect zoning barriers against members of minority
,,5/ groups trying to migrate from cities. -
This pinpoints one of the major arguments supporting state-wide
zoning. Local control of zoning ordinances has become a tool in the
practice of economic segregation. It has promoted the Balkanization of
urban places, and deprived them of the invigorating power of economic,
social and cultural heterogeneity. Within the boundaries of rule-making
districts, land use patterns have become more homogenized. The municipal
boundary becomes the most important
suburb is his castle, and zoning is
We are in the process of recreating
based power.
boundary to the land user. His
the moat that surrounds and protects.
new feudal seats of municipal land-
The power of these fiefs and baronies challenges that of the state.
This is why a major part of the struggle for better regulation of land
uses is a struggle between units of government , which have come to repre-
sent socio-economic classes.
It is in this sense that the class struggle is being reinterpreted
in our suburbs. And it is this fact that has contributed to the deter-
ioration of faith in zoning as a tool to regulate land use. It has
been used to internalize the benefits and externalize the costs of land
use, and especially in the social sphere. This is why pressures for
state-wide zoning generate such violent reactions.
~/ Ronald Sullivan, “UAW Maintains a Jersey Suburb Keeps Out Poor”,
New York Times, Jan. 29, 1971, p. 1. —— —
~/ Carter B. Horsley, “Company Brings Suit to Fight 5-Acre Zoning in
New Jersey”, New York Times, Sept. 2, 1971, p. 27. —— —
5_/ Murray Schumach, “State Study Asks a Curb on Zoning”, New York Times,
June 15, 1973, p. 33.
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Underlying these changes are fundamental shifts in the economic and
social structure. Two images of society are in conflict. In the
traditional view, the socio-economic structure is visualized as a
pyramid, with the bulk of the population in low income classes at the
bottom. In contrast, a more realistic view is to recognize that the
socio-economic structure is beginning to resemble a cube, standing
6/
on one of its points.- The masses are in the middle. This is a
dominant fact of contemporary economic and political life.
As a consequence, the tax-paying population includes a large number
of “new” taxpayers who come from families that have never in their family
histories paid significant amounts of income tax or property tax.
Higher income levels and the expansion of private home ownership are
introducing these families to a class of problems never experienced
before, and for which their family traditions have not prepared them.
There has been a sharp increase in awareness of the burden of
direct taxes, and an even greater increase in awareness of the desira-
bility of avoiding the burden. This has been a major force in determining
our patterns of land use.
The result has been to set in motion a socio-economic sorting-out
process. Low and lower middle class income groups have a high resistance
to tax paying. They are apt to vote down bond issues for more or better
schools. Those who want better public services, and above all better
schools, move out of the central cities. An income stratification of
suburbs tends to result, with higher-income taxpayers clustering in
areas where they can get the quality of services they demand.
This migration of those who understand what taxes are for, and are
willing to pay them if the services are good, impoverishes the central
city in two ways:
a) By reducing income levels, property values and taxpaying capacity
b) By robbing the core city of civic leaders, and of men and women
who feel responsible for “their” city.
~/ This trend is clearly marked in the agricultural sector. See T. Lynn
Smith, “A Study of the Variations in the Class Structure of Farm Society
in the United States According to Type of Farming”, paper presented
at the 1971 Meeting of the Rural Sociological Society, Denver, Colorado,
Aug. 26-31, 1971.8
A more serious consequence of socio-economic stratification is the
loss of heterogeneity in our schools.
“A major problem in American education today is that public schools,
reflecting and in turn influencing residential patterns, are becoming
increasingly homogenous. .. The relationships here are complex and uncertain,
and excessive heterogeneity in schools and classrooms may be as unproductive
as excessive homogeneity. But the evidence seems to be that some racial,
,,~/
social and intellectual heterogeneity is productive.
In characteristic fashion we turn to the motor vehicle for solution.
The resulting bussing controversies have given rise to some of the
ugliest incidents of our time, but the underlying cause is seldom traced
to the defects in land policy that have generated major parts of the
problem.
The propelling forces in the evolution of zoning have been micro-en-
vironmental in nature: Prevention of “sunless canyons” in skyscraper
cities, protection of health through local control of sewage disposal
and water supplies, avoidance of nuisance and noxious land uses, protection
of “the neighborhood.” The goals of these controls have been comparable
to the objective functions in partial-equilibrium solutions to profit-
maximizing problems in economic analyais, using the theory of the firm.
The “firm” in the zoning case has been the municipality, the township,
occasionally the county, rarely the region and only in Hawaii has it
been the state. There has been no mechanism in our application of
zoning to permit the consideration of macro-environmental issues.
Zoning not only invitesthe abuse of existing externalities, it creates
new ones.
In this setting, the sudden emergence of threats to the environment
that transcend local government boundaries has revealed the inadequacy
of our methods of land use control. We have no devices that bring macro-
environmental data into the framework in which land use decisions are
made. The private firm cannot afford to do so. The public firms empowered
to zone have no authority to do so. Fear for the environment has become
7_/ James Tobin, “on Limiting the Domain of Inequality”, Journal of Law
and Econ., Vol. XIII, No. 2, October 1970, p. 272.
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the American equivalent of the threats of blocka& or food shortages that
have supported strict land use controls in other countries.
Just how effective will the environmental threat be in reforming
our attitudes toward the goals and methods of land use control? Bosselman
and Callies argue in The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control that a —— —
major reason for this revolution is the change that has taken place in
our conceptof land. In the paat we viewed land as a commodity, and
zoning was a control device consistent with this view. The key supporting
arguments that he land user should be prevented from engaging in uses
that depreciated the value of his neighbor’s land. More recently, they
argue,we have begun to treat land not only as a commodity but as a
resource . In their view, land as a resource introduces considerations
of conservation, protection and preservation that are ignored or under-
valued when land is treated as a commodity.
This distinction between land as a commodity and land as a resource
is not very helpful. The term resource is conventionally defined as an
input into a production process. This leaves unresolved the questions
of what is produced, andin what types of markets is the product exchanged.
A major cause of the change in our attitudes toward land is found
in the changing nature of the markets in which it is traded. The auto-
mobile and the airplane have greatly expanded thenarket for land as a
consumer good. Our past attitudes toward land have reflected primarily
our view of it as a producer’s good. Land was needed for a food supply,
or for timber supply, or for minerals. Our laws regulating land ownership,
use and exchange embody this concept.
The dramatic change that has occurred in our time is the enormous
expansion of the market areas in which land is desired for housing, for
recreation, for scenic beauty, for isolation and for related purposes
that fall within the economy of the household rather than the economy
of the firm. It is the demand for land as a consumer’s good that has
generated the revolution in land uae control.
We are only just beginning to understand the operation of this
expanded land market. It ia badly structured, the services of land that
are demanded are non-standardized, and we lack good classifications and
descriptions of the differential capscity of lands to provide these10
services . The market, in short, is lacking in essential elements needed
for efficient operation.
One measure of the change that is occuring in response to this new
dimension of demand for land is provided by the many ways in which the
services of land are being redefined, disaggregated, and separately traded.
M the United States, the first major step in this direction involved
the separation of mineral rights, and in the Western statea, of water
rights . These are long standing practices, and the markets in which
they are exchanged are reasonably well organized. The new dimensions
have come in the separate identification of air rights, of scenic values,
of watershed protection needs, of wildlife habitats, and of environmental
protection measures embodied in air and water pollution controls.
The legal framework for the separate identification of these rights
in land has been constructed. Markets exist in which the first halting
and cumbersome exchanges are taking place. One major element in this
“new demand” for land that is not well served by market processes is
the demand for residential and recreational sites. That market has
suddenly become national and even international, while the totality of
our body of laws and regulations that govern its operation are state and
localin nature. And the automobile and airplane inject the demand for
home and recreational sites into competition with agricultural, forest
and grazing land uses for which our institutional structure not only
provides no protection but intensifies the conflict.
The focus of this conflict is most sharply visible in our policies
on property taxation. It is rapidly becoming impossible to tax land
fairly on the baais of market values in a pluralistic market in which
agricultural lands acquire market valuea that have no relation to the
relative or absolute levels of productivity of the land in agricultural
use.
Paralleling this change in the nature of the market for land services,
our concept of the nature d the firm that is involved in land use decisions
has also undergone a major change. At one extreme is the common property
firm, or public agency. This may involve outright ownership, or control
so extensive that it amounts to ownership. This is now a major control11
device, and use of this level of control will almost surely increase.
The more interesting area of control is the intermediate area
occupied by mixed firms that involve both private profit-oriented firms
and public agencies or administrative firms. The expansion in the uses
of easements, partial takings, access limitations licences for specific
uses, controls exercised through municipal water supply and sewage disposal
firms, airport and port commissions and quasi-public development corporations
all provide evidence of the pervasive nature of this form of land use
control.
Underlying this trend is a fundamental transformation in ideology.
This must surely be recorded as the dominant dimension of our changing
attitude toward the goals and methods of land use control.
The identification of good and evil with private and public owner-
ship and control of land, in its broadest sense, is a measure of the
degree to which much of our thought haa been dominated by nal’ve ideologies.
These absolutistic versions of ideology are crumbling. We can see this
most clearly when we invert the ideology and view other countries. Milovan
Djilas, the perceptive Yugoslav critic of ideology, can see the equation
of evil and good with private and public ownership clearly on the decline
8/
in Eastern Europe, though not yet in the Soviet Union.-
What is more difficult for us to recognize is that this decline in
the paralyzing power of ideology is also evident in the United States.
This is the most significant dimension of the quiet revolution in land
use control, and the one that we find moat difficult to acknowledge.
The changing nature of the markets in which the services of land
are traded raises basic questions about the extent to which market
processes can be relied upon to achieve land uses in the public interest.
It is less significant to observe that we are beginning to look upon
land as a resource, however defined, than it is to recognize that we
are increasingly regarding access to certain types of land services
as rights that are not properly distributed by sale to the highest
bidder . Rights to pure air, pure water and the
~/ Milovan Djilas, ‘Withering Ideologies”, The
24, 1973, p. 33.
protection of watersheds,
New York Times, August —— —12
access to scenic beauty, opportunities for recreation, and a share in
the national endowment of open space are not mentioned in the United
States Constitution. Our courts, our legislatures, and responsive
governments where they exist are busily reinterpreting the Bill of
Rights to include these entitlements.
The resulting expansion in modes and degree of land use control
raises fundamental questions that go straight to the constitutional
prohibition against the taking of private property without compensation.
What is a “taking”? This is the question raised in the sequel to The
-Revolution i.n~~ Control just published by the Council
on Environmental Quality.-
The first major reformulation of the answer to this question after
the Second World War was a result of the Interstate Highway program.
Access was controlled, i.e. taken, and in many cases no compensation
was paid. Land uses adjacent to Interstate Highways but not touched
by them were impaired and again, in the majority of cases, no compen-
sation was paid. The basis for this expansion of the permitted scope
of public interference in private land use was laid in the 1950’s. In
this sense it can be argued that the flowering of the automobile era
laid the foundation for a further expansion of public control over
private land when the full impact of the environmental crisis struck
later in the 1960’s. The precedent for expanded public interference
in a land use?% freedom of use was laid by the motor car, the same instru-
ment that has contributed so heavily to the expanded demand for land as
a consumer’s good, and to the environmental damage that reinforced the
pressures for more land uae controls.
Valuation problems are central to the taking issue, and our tra-
dition ia to resolve these by turning to market prices. This added
demand upon the land market process comes at a time when the ability
of the market to yield unambiguous answers has been impaired.
9_/ See Fred Bosselman, David Callies, and John Banta, The Takin~
Issue, Washington, Council on Environmental Quality, July 1973.13
The concept of market price loses precision when ability to enter
the market is reduced. Up to about 1960 it was reasonable to base land
policy on the assumption that land ownership was becoming more diffused
in the United States. The Taylor Grazing Act had effectively closed
major portions of the frontier in 1934, but there was still homesteading
after the Second World War. The headlong suburban expansion of the
1950’s and 1960’s made land owners of families who in earlier eras of
urban growth would have been renters. But there is evidence that this
diffusion of land ownership is coming to a halt.
Between 1950 and 1973 the number of farms was cut in half, while
the acreage of land in farms remained virtually unchanged. We cannot
speak with precision, since no nationwide study has been made since
1946. But it is unmistakably clear that there haa been a major concen-
tration in farm land ownership.
The 1960’s witnessed the appearance of a new phenomenon in the
American urban pattern: multiple-story and high-rise housing in the
suburbs. Much of the recent suburban expansion has not been in owner-
occupied single family detached housing. The rate at which new land
owners are being created in the suburbs is slowing down.
Our property and income tax structures bear a heavy responsibility
for these rural and urban trenda. BYtaxing earned income at a progressive
rate and capital gains at a flat rate, we guarantee that wealthy buyers
can bid the highest prices for lands that are expected to enjoy capital
gains . By depreciation rules, loss carry forward and carry back pro-
visions, and permissive accounting procedures we insure that large
firms are given the greatest tax-based incentives to enter the farm
land or housing markets. Inflation has augmented these trends. High
interest rates drive individuals and small firms out of the market,
since our package of tax-based incentives is not available to those
with low incomes or limited capacity to use financial leverage.
The l~d market is increasingly concentrated in fewer and fewer hands,
but we lack the data necessary to measure this trend. The increasing
complexity of our corporate business world makes it difficult to identify
the true land owners. The entry of conglomerate corporations into the
housing and farm land markets results in a sharp decrease in publicly
available financial and accounting information. In some states, for14
example, Arizona, the practice of accepting deeda recorded in the
names of nominees or trustees makes it impossible to determine land
ownership from public records. It is becoming increasingly difficult
to answer the question: Who owns this land? The flow of information
in the land market ia drying up, at a time when we need it most.
The concept of a market price also loses economic relevance
when market price signals become echoes of public policies. To the
extent that tax and financial advantages are bid into higher prices
for land, a taking of land for public purposes that results in compen-
sation based on these prices involves the use of public funds to pay
for values created by public policy.
If we are to uae market processes in allocating land, a major
effort is needed to improve the market. Some of the key steps that
must be taken are concentrated at the national level of government,
in income tax policy, accounting rules, and corporate financial
disclosure requirements. It is for this reason that any attempt to
promote land use in the public interest thrcugh market processes must
include a far larger role for the federal government than has been
thought necessary in the past. No ideological judgement is involved
in this conclusion. It is the inevitable consequence of the changing
nature of the land market.
This must not be interpreted as blind support for more land use
controls. Costs are always present in any use of power to control.
The popular recognition of the high coat of land use controls is focused
on bureaucratic salaries, the size of planning staffs, and the “cost
to the taxpayer.” These may be the least significant cost elements.
The added time cost involved in land development decisions is often
the most important direct cost of increased control. The burden of time
costs increases dramatically when interest rates and tax rates are
high. Theserates are now at the highest levels we have known in this
century. As a consequence the costs of controls are among the most
rapidly increasing elements in land development costs. These are
passed on to the consumer in a market economy . They play a major
role in the current high coat of housing, and seem likely to play an
even greater role in future costs of fuel and energy.15
There is another dimension to the cost of controls that in the long
run may prove to be the most significant. The cost of plan preparation,
waiting for plan approval,mcompliance with changes required by planning
bodies are all a part of overhead costs. And they are frontloaded costs,
which have an impact on cash flow that is often out of all proportion
to their significance in total project costs.
As a consequence, they are highly regressive over the spectrum of
firm sizes. The smaller firm may be required to incur plan-imposed
costs that are almost as high as would be required for a project many
times as large. Per-unit costs are disproportionately increased to the
small firm, and there are few opportunities to offset these costs with
less formal and time-consuming planning procedures.
Land use controls are thus a form of discriminatory tax on small
firms. They may well become the dominant force in determining the op-
timum size of firm in our economy. By adopting a complex of land use
controls we may unintentionally be insuring that only large firms can
survive. This raises the prospect of food, fuel, and housing markets
dominated by large firms, whose creation and survival has been dictated
by a public policy aimed at other goals.
A typical barrier to land reform in developing countries has been
the almost total absence of local organized interest groups. Laws
have been enacted, central government agencies have been created, but
implementation breaks down because there are no para-political
organizations to aid in administering and policing the programs at the
local level. The situation is reversed in the United States. We
have a multitude of local interest groups focused on land uae problems.
They support a rich collection of competing units of government. But
we have no central government agency with coordinating powers, and
only a weak body of law at the federal government level to give
guidance to land use controls.
As a result, we face the real danger that land use controls will
be distorted to serve the interest of specialized groups. From the
~i~flicts of the past decade we can identify the following examples
of the promotion of land use controls in pursuit of single-valued
goals:16
1.) Prevention of urban encroachment on farm lands
2.) Conventional system of zoning to “protect the neighborhood”
3.) Wildlife protection
4.) Shoreland protection
5.) Creation of special recreation and wilderness areas
6.) Forest land protection
7.) Promotion of private road transport
8.) Promotion of public mass transit
9.) Water quality control
10.) Air quality control
The list is not exhaustive but it illustrates the urgent need for
coordination at the national level. As Professor G.P. Wibberley
pointed out at a recent conference on rural land use planning in
Europe, “If these interest groups can get a separate, specialized
government department as an ally, they are much more dangerous in
10/
twisting environmental planning along specialist lines.”-
The risk in the United States today is that this twisting will
take place in the search for solutions to environmental threats that
evoke a fear psychosis. The most prominent are air pollution, water
pollution, and shortfalls in fuel and energy supplies. These have
the power to generate emotional reactions that transcend other motives
for land use control. This potential for fear-induced action is an
open invitation to specialized interest groups to exaggerate environmental
threats as a least-cost method of precipitating public policy decisions.
And they are likely to be bad decisions. We are in danger of adopting
land uae control policies that rest on a faulty understanding of the
nature of our resource endowment. In choosing the goals and methods
of land use control we will do well to recall lhmrd Odum’s injunction
that we should always keep intact the age-old quartet of man and land,
time and space.
10/ G.P. Wibberley, “The Planning of Rural Areas With Special —
to Europe: An Analy@is of Past Experience and Its Lesson
Future”, FAO, Second Ad Hoc Conference on the Planning of




The automobile, the airplane and the moon-rockets have taught us
that we cannot define space without a concept of time. In the same vein,
we cannot define land independently of man. There is no resource until
one is recognized by man. Its quantity cannot be measured, except in
terms of the use to which it is put. These uses, in turn, are a function
of rates of recovery, costs of transport, efficiency in conversion, and
consumer tastes. These change, and the available stock of resources
changes with them.
A stock of resources is thus not a physical quantity. The stock
is created by man, in that it cannot be said to exist in economic terms
until he can use it. A resource, in this view, is a cultural achievement,
a unit of thought.
An example will illustrate this point. There are minerals in the
ground that we do not know are there. The fact that we do not know they
are there, or that we see them and do not know what to do with them, leads
us to exclude them from our stock of resources.
Because we do not know they are there, or do not know what to do with
them, we are unable to define a stock or supply of resources, except in
terms of man’s intelligence and skill in putting them to use. This
intelligence and these skills are not finite. And therefore our stock
of resources is not finite.
It is in this sense that the concept of “spaceship earth” has had
a perverse influence. It has hardened the idea that we live on a finite
planet, therefore we are in danger of exhausting its resources.
From this finite assumption we derive many of our basic philosophical
and religious precepts. It is the basis for the concept of limited good,
on which so much of our current political policy is based. If you can
get more, then I must be satisfied with less. If I am to prosper, I
must do so at the expense of someone else. If the developing nations
are to overcome their poverty, the developed nations must consume less.
If land use controls are to be effective, they must prevent the
consumption of some resource. If there are to be resources for our
grandchildren, we must cut back on our rate of use in this generation.
As a policy for survival, we must stop growth, and strive for a stable
state. We are victims of a modern version of the “end of the frontier”
psychosis.18
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This point of view can be illustrated by two quotations from Paul
11/
Erlich:—
“The Earth has come largely under the control of a culture which
traditionally sees man’s proper role as dominating nature, rather than
living in harmony with it... I think our first move must be to convince
all those we can that the planet Earth must be viewed as a space ship
of limited carrying capacity.”
These prescriptions betray a fundamental failure to understand
the nature of resources. In an economic sense, they are created by
man. They can be altered by man. And because our capacity for
intellectual and spiritual growth is not limited, our stock of resources
is not limited, in the conventional sense.
But there is a sense in which our stock of resources is limited.
We can put a stop to intellectual growth. We can reach levels of
over-population that destroy social and political organization. We
can have levels of pollution , congestion and overcrowding that cause
us to “bite each otherb tails”, as pigs do in close confinement.
In these ways we can limit or destroy our stock of resources.
The surest way to do this is to destroy intellectual freedom in our
universities and schools. This is where resources are created. And
this is why the ultimate measure of our stock of resources is to be
found in our cultural commitment, in our social stability, and in our
ability to live at peace with our fellow men.
This is the recognition that can define a sound choice of rules for
land use control. We need multiple methods because we have multiple
goals. For many of our land use problems, public ownership is the
preferred solution. For others, we can rely on the flexibility that
is offered by innovations in zoning and use of the police power. The
public-law corporation is a useful alternative, particularly in land use
problems associated with transport and river basin development. The
improvement of market processes hold great potential, and a reform in
tax policies can contribute greatly to this end.
I_&/ Paul Erlich, ‘World Population: A Battle Lost”, Stanford Today,
Winter 1968, p. 4.19
We need controls that protect and preserve, and controls that encourage
full use and future development. It will be a disservice to the
cause of land use planning if it is identified with an anti-technology
bias and a no-growth policy. We can ride the environmental protection
tiger, but it will take a great deal of skill, and no dogmatism.